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The misty crystal ball: 
Efficient concealment of privacy-sensitive attributes in predictive analytics 
Nicolas Banholzer1  








Individuals are becoming increasingly concerned with privacy. This curtails their willingness to 
share sensitive attributes like age, gender or personal preferences; yet firms largely rely upon 
customer data in any type of predictive analytics. Hence, organizations are confronted with a 
dilemma in which they need to make a tradeoff between a sparse use of data and the utility from 
better predictive analytics. This paper proposes a masking mechanism that obscures sensitive 
attributes while maintaining a large degree of predictive power. More precisely, we efficiently 
identify data partitions that are best suited for (i) shuffling, (ii) swapping and, as a form of 
randomization, (iii) perturbing attributes by conditional replacement. By operating on data 
partitions that are derived from a predictive algorithm, we achieve the objective of masking 
privacy-sensitive attributes with marginal downsides for predictive modeling. The resulting 
trade-off between masking and predictive utility is empirically evaluated in the context of 
customer churn where, for instance, a stratified shuffling of attribute values impedes predictive 
accuracy rarely by more than a percentage point. Our proposed framework entails direct 
managerial implications as a growing share of firms adopts predictive analytics and thus requires 
mechanisms that better adhere to user demands for information privacy. 
Keywords: information privacy; data masking; perturbation; predictive analytics; tree methods 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Personal information is valuable to online services (Bansal et al., 2010); however, 
individuals are increasingly concerned about their privacy. In fact, 82 percent of online users are 
reluctant to share personal information and more than a third has already given false information 
about themselves (Teltzrow and Kobsa, 2004). Information systems (IS) research has early 
noticed the importance of privacy for users (Hann et al., 2007) and the resulting demands by 
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practitioners for privacy-preserving technologies (e. g., Li and Raghunathan, 2014; Li and Sarkar, 
2006, 2013). 
Earlier research on privacy-preserving mechanisms can be distinguished by different goals, 
regarding which type of data is concealed (Duncan and Lambert, 1989). On the one hand, a set of 
methods has been developed in order to prevent identity disclosure, which is an important issue 
when data is supposed to be shared anonymously between a data owner and a third party (e. g., Li 
and Sarkar, 2013; Zhu et al., 2009). On the other hand, there is growing interest in so-called 
information privacy, which deals with individual concerns about confidentiality of certain 
sensitive attributes (Hann et al., 2007). This stream of literature acknowledges that certain data 
need to be stored for operational or legal reasons. Examples could consist of online shopping 
where billing addresses are needed for shipments or names need to be stored for tax audits. 
However, for sensitive attributes, such as age or gender, users expect organizations to be prudent. 
As part of their concerns about information privacy, users prefer sensitive attributes to be masked 
instead of being stored with their original value. 
Prior work has addressed information privacy, but the methods for data masking focus on 
retaining important statistical properties (Li and Sarkar, 2006; Muralidhar and Sarathy, 2006), 
thereby ignoring the effect on predictive analytics. That is, privacy mechanisms must conceal 
attributes deemed sensitive, but still afford the use of predictive insights. However, there is 
reason to believe that even modest privacy gains almost completely destroy any analytical utility 
(Brickell and Shmatikov, 2008). It appears as if both information privacy and predictive utility 
cannot be achieved simultaneously and should rather be assumed mutually exclusive. This 
motivates our research as follows. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: Designing a predictive framework for masking privacy-sensitive 
attributes in a given dataset while maintaining predictive power. 
In order to address our research objective, we propose a mechanism for protecting 
information privacy in predictive analytics. Thereby, we solve the decision problem of 
identifying attribute values that are best suited for masking by mitigating the effects on predictive 
performance. We approach this problem by partitioning the data into groups. Within each 
subgroup, masking is either accomplished by shuffling or swapping values between observations, 
or by replacing values with noisy ones from intervals that are clever chosen but can potentially be 
large. Our masking mechanism maintains some of the statistical properties from the underlying 
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distribution such as summary statistics in the case of shuffling. More importantly though, it 
makes a sparse use of data and perturbs sensitive attributes with little interferences concerning a 
given prediction task. 
Our framework is evaluated by adapting the notion of regret to data masking, thereby 
obtaining a rigorous metric for assessing the loss in predictive power. As such, it complements 
established measures for gains in information privacy. Taken together, they support data-driven 
decision making by displaying the trade-off between information privacy and predictive 
analytics. 
We perform a series of computational experiments in order to study how our proposed 
mechanism competes in a real-world setting. For this reason, we draw upon the task of predicting 
churn, as privacy-sensitive attributes are known to be associated with considerable prognostic 
capacity. This links to a direct trade-off between information privacy and predictive utility. For 
instance, our swapping mechanism masks an unknown portion of approximately 80 % of all 
values from a sensitive attribute, yet the changes in prediction performance (i. e., area under the 
curve) remain below a single percentage point. We further compare our mechanism for data 
masking across a variety of base classifiers in order to demonstrate that it consistently 
accomplishes only marginal effects on our regret metric, which thus contributes to the 
generalizability of mechanisms. 
Our proposed prediction framework entails direct implications for individuals, IS 
practitioners and managers. First, individuals benefit from the fact that sensitive attributes 
become concealed before the data is permanently stored and eventually analyzed. Second, our 
predictive framework facilitates firms that want to strengthen information privacy. Here it allows 
firms to strategically choose a desired balance between a scarce use of sensitive data and 
expected benefits from predictive analytics. Third, we find that information privacy and firm 
utility are not incompatible and, with the necessary care in formulating the underlying decision 
problem, both objectives can be achieved simultaneously. In fact, our regret metric enables 
practitioners to assess the effects of perturbing sensitive information on firm utility 
quantitatively. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes earlier attempts in privacy-
preserving analytics, revealing that these works are mostly concerned with anonymity and the 
potential risk of re-identifying individuals, while there is a scarcity of mechanisms with the 
Banholzer and Feuerriegel  Data Masking in Predictive Analytics  
Proceedings of the 13th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, San Francisco, December 13, 2018 4 
 
ability of data masking subject to preserving predictive utility. As a remedy, Section 3 proposes 
our decision problems that reconciles both goals: predictive modeling with strategic data 
masking. These mechanisms are then evaluated using a real-world study where churn is predicted 
(Section 4). Our findings lends to direct implications for management and IS practice as 
discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes. 
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Information Privacy 
There are several ways for firms to address privacy concerns. In recent years, differential privacy 
has emerged as a rigorous solution to protect personal information by giving mathematical 
guarantees about disclosure risks (Dwork, 2008). However, such high standards leave aside the 
fact that privacy demands are heterogeneous with some individuals guarding their privacy and 
others seeking convenience in more personalized service offerings through sharing personal 
information (Hann et al., 2007). It is possible for organizations to address this heterogeneity by 
catering to an individual’s perception of how sensitive data is being handled. For instance, 
information practices (Culnan and Armstrong, 1999) and user control (Fusilier and Hoyer, 1980; 
Stone et al., 1983) can reconcile different demands for information privacy. Accordingly, we 
define information privacy as perceivable organizational efforts to conceal sensitive data about 
individuals, irrespective of whether firms themselves or the user controls data dissemination. 
By definition, our work concerns the relationship between organizations and individuals from 
which they collect data. Individuals – in the sense “indivisible” – are uniquely identified by some 
attributes as name, phone or social security number, the so-called identifying attributes. Though 
anonymity matters a great deal to individuals, what they are more worried about is that their 
sensitive attributes, such as salary, medical test rest results or sexual orientation, are not revealed 
and related to their identity (Li and Raghunathan, 2014). Accordingly, privacy literature 
distinguishes two kinds of disclosures: identity and attribute disclosure (Duncan and Lambert, 
1989). Preventing identity disclosure is a considerable issue when releasing data for analytical 
purposes to secondary users such as researchers (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008). 
In order to address this issue, a large stream of literature began developing models which 
minimize the re-identification risk when disseminating data (e. g., Li et al., 2007; 
Machanavajjhala et al., 2006; Sweeney, 2002). However, the data owner himself often needs to 
retain the identifiability of the individuals in his database. Therefore, keeping the risk of identity 
Banholzer and Feuerriegel  Data Masking in Predictive Analytics  
Proceedings of the 13th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, San Francisco, December 13, 2018 5 
 
disclosure in mind, privacy-aware firms are also searching for mechanisms to mitigate the 
disclosure of sensitive attributes. 
Privacy-Preserving Data Masking 
Adam and Worthmann (1989) classify masking algorithms in statistical databases into 
four categories: conceptual, query restriction, data perturbation and output perturbation. For 
analytics tasks, research has found that not all are applicable (Zhu et al., 2009). Whilst conceptual 
approaches matter when designing privacypreserving data mining algorithms, our focus is on 
data perturbation techniques. Nowadays, perturbation techniques are often categorized under a 
more general notion of data masking techniques that include techniques beyond perturbation 
(Muralidhar and Sarathy, 2006). Below we summarize some concepts of masking models and 
related privacy-preserving algorithms. 
Carefully derived algorithms have been found to establish a very strong from of privacy. 
Yet even though efficient solutions exist, they are often impractical (Yang et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, cryptographic approaches rather deal with the problem of sharing or jointly 
analyzing distributed databases with external parties, whereas the focus of this paper is the direct 
relationship between a user and an organization. 
Microaggregation follows the idea of aggregating micro data into broader groups that 
provide anonymity to the individual on the group level. Some key concepts of anonymization 
based on microaggregation include k-anonymity (Samarati and Sweeney, 1998), l-diversity 
(Machanavajjhala et al., 2006) and t-closeness (Li et al., 2007). Data is said to be k-anonymous if 
an individual record cannot be distinguished from at least k − 1 individual records. Unfortunately, 
if a group of k individual records are indistinguishable, then an adversary is able to ascertain 
confidential values of a known member even from a homogeneous group. Therefore, grouped 
data is said to be additionally l-diverse if – simply put – there are at least l distinct values of the 
confidential attribute in each group. However, if confidential attributes are subject to highly 
skewed distributions, l-diversity can result in groups where the distribution of the confidential 
attribute differs substantially from the overall distribution. In this case, analytical findings can 
turn out to be misleading. Taking this problem into account, t-closeness requires that the distance 
between the group and overall distribution of a confidential attribute does not exceed a certain 
threshold t. 
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LeFevre et al. (2006) presents algorithms that satisfy k-anonymity, optionally l-diversity, 
but remain useful for classification or regression tasks. However, Brickell and Shmatikov (2008) 
finds that their application is in fact destructive to utility. Li and Sarkar (2006) propose an 
effective clustering-based method for masking categorical data. However, their method suffers 
from a disadvantage pertaining to most other microaggregation methods, which create groups 
where attribute similarity is greater within than between groups. This carries the risk of 
confidential attribute disclosure. In response, Li and Sarkar (2013) build a minimum spanning 
tree technique that creates groups where non-confidential attributes are similar, but confidential 
attributes are well distributed. 
Rather than aggregating data, perturbation techniques randomize the individual records, 
e. g., by adding noise or shuffling attribute values. Shuffling preserves the marginal distribution 
of the data, whereas it depends on the desired strength of privacy how adding noise will alter the 
distribution. Both techniques have in common that inserting randomness will deprive data of 
information. Therefore, a large stream of research has been dedicated to build algorithms and 
models which transform data to ensure privacy and, simultaneously, keep it suitable for analytical 
purposes. Aggarwal and Yu (2008) provide a comprehensive survey of privacy-preserving data 
mining techniques, which includes – but is not limited to – perturbation. 
The majority of privacy-preserving data masking is concerned with anonymity. However, 
the presented techniques, such as perturbation, are adaptable to serve a different goal of 
obscuring sensitive data as well (see e. g., Li and Sarkar, 2006; Muralidhar and Sarathy, 2006). 
This is important in the organizational context where identifying attributes need to be stored for 
operational or legal reasons, and anonymity is thus no 
longer attainable. 
2.2 Research Gap 
Privacy mechanisms are commonly developed with the premise of ensuring anonymity. Such 
differentially private mechanisms establish scientific guarantees about the re-identification risk of 
individuals (Cynthia Dwork, 2006; Dwork, 2008). While vigorous protection of identity is a 
noble objective, it is overambitious in cases where organizations require identifying attributes for 
operational purposes. None the less, they may feel obliged to react to individual concerns about 
information privacy. For that reason, the field of privacy-preserving data mining has contributed 
various algorithms to prevent disclosure of sensitive information (Aggarwal and Yu, 2008). 
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Corresponding algorithms mask sensitive attributes and preserve statistical properties of the data 
(Li and Sarkar, 2006; Muralidhar and Sarathy, 2006). However, prior work does not take into 
account predictive analytics, which is a considerable issue because transforming data can be 
destructive to its utility (Brickell and Shmatikov, 2008). As a remedy, we develop a privacy 
mechanism that masks attributes deemed sensitive but with marginal downsides for predictive 
power. 
Within the field of privacy-preserving data mining, there is no consistent way of quantifying 
the effects of data masking on data utility. But lacking a measurement puts firms at risk of 
forfeiting predictive utility without reaping the benefits of improved privacy. In this paper, we 
adopt the mathematical concept of regret to quantify the loss in predictive utility from 
transforming sensitive attributes under privacy considerations. A small regret informs firms about 
idle privacy potential, whereas a large regret warns them about destructive effects on predictive 
utility. Hitherto considered mutually exclusive, a comparison of regret emphasizes that there is a 
trade-off between between privacy and predictive analytics. 
3 METHOD DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Intuition 
While privacy is important for users (Hann et al., 2007), predictive analytics still plays a 
vital role for business (Fayyad et al., 1966). A frequent task in this discipline is classification, i. 
e., predicting the class label for an observation from its attributes. Masking attributes most likely 
impedes predictive accuracy because changing the attribute values corresponds to a loss in 
information. Thus, organizational efforts to strengthen information privacy in the form of data 
masking appear to run opposite to objectives in predictive analytics. 
In order to resolve the conflicting goals of privacy and predictive utility, we postulate the 
idea that certain subsets of the data (i. e., so-called partitions) can be identified where, on the one 
hand, data masking is applied to conceal sensitive attributes. However, on the other hand, the 
prediction label for the observations in the partition are fairly similar and, hence, the masking 
operation has little effect on the overall predictive power. The underlying operations for masking 
sensitive attributes can then follow common strategies from the literature, namely, (i) shuffling, 
(ii) swapping, or (iii) replacing values. 
Mathematically, we formalize the intuition behind our approach as follows. Let S refer to 
the sensitive attributes prior and  after applying the masking operation. Further, let X denote all 
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remaining attributes which are not sensitive but nevertheless reported. Then, the objective in 
prediction is to estimate a model f that models Y based on S and X, i. e., 
 
The idea is that we partition the data (X,S) = D1 ∪ ... ∪ Dn into several disjoint subsets Di, i = 
1,...,n with Di ∩ Dj = ∅ for i ≠ j. Within each partition Di, we expect that a different classifier f ’  
that is trained with  (instead of S) will obtain a similar outcome to f, i. e., 
Hence, the original predictive ability is retained for each partition. 
3.2 Data Masking 
Table 1 illustrates the effects of several data masking techniques on the original data. For 
instance, shuffling attribute values between observations is a particularly attractive technique in 
data masking because it perturbs the data without transforming the marginal distribution of an 
attribute (Muralidhar and Sarathy, 2006). 
We first consider optimizing shuffling and swapping as permutation techniques for data 
masking. Let s = (s1,...,sd) be a vector of d = |Di| expressions for sensitive attribute Sk in partition 
Di and let Π(s) be a permutation of s with  being the set of all possible permutations. Intuitively, 
we would want the permuted attribute values to be very different from the original ones. We 
achieve this goal by choosing the permutation that minimizes an equally weighted mean of 
Kendall’s τ rank and Pearson’s ρ linear correlation such that the average correlation approximates 
zero. 
In contrast to permuting the original attribute values, replacing perturbs data through 
conditional replacement by sampling from an arbitrary distribution. For simplicity, we assume a 
uniform distribution, where the upper and lower bound correspond to the partition boundaries.2 
3.3 Tree-Based Partioning 
We suggest estimating a decision tree to accomplish our goal of masking sensitive 
attributes while mitigating the effects on predictive utility. This is because decision trees are very 
powerful in both partitioning and predicting, which previous studies have demonstrated in the 
context of privacy (Estivill-Castro and Brankovic, 1999; Li and Sarkar, 2009; Lindell and Pinkas, 
                                                                
2 Replacing is used only for numerical variables. For categorical variables, we pertain to permutation techniques. 
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2002; Vaidya and Clifton, 2005). For instance, Li and Sarkar (2009) note their ability to mine 
sensitive information. In response, they propose a tree pruning approach for protection from tree-
based classification attacks. Estivill-Castro and Brankovic (1999) observe that a permutation of 
the class labels within a data partition will not alter the assigned majority by the tree, but create 
uncertainty about the true class label of an individual. Finally, Lindell and Pinkas (2002) and 
Vaidya and Clifton (2005) develop tree-based privacy-preserving algorithms for horizontally and 
vertically distributed databases respectively. 
In this work, we make use of the decision tree model developed in (Therneau et al., 1997). 
Based on recursive partitioning, data is recursively split into subgroups until a stopping criterion 
terminates the process. The path this observation traverses in the tree then determines the class 
label for an observation. Similar observations traverse the same path and thus each leaf node in 
the tree forms a group of observations; the data partition. 
Small partitions or sharp constraints impede data masking because there is limited potential 
to permute or replace attribute values. This possibly leads to insufficient levels of information 
privacy. Naturally, the number of observations in a partition and the number of constraints are 
linked to the size of the decision tree. Recursive partitioning offers several ways for controlling 
the size of the tree. For instance, one can impose a minimum number of observations before 
making another split (Therneau et al., 1997). More commonly, a larger tree is grown first and 
subsequently pruned by removing splits that increase model complexity disproportionately. 
Intended to prevent overfitting (Therneau et al., 1997), pruning can also be employed to enforce 
stronger data masking. 
3.4 Regret Metric for Predictive Performance 
The objective of our masking mechanism is to solve a decision problem for organizations 
with a limited privacy budget. More formally, let D be the organization’s database. After 
masking sensitive attributes in D with technique Tj, j ∈ {1,...,m}, the data is transformed to D˜j. 
Now, assume the firm has a classification task where it wants to accurately predict the binary 
binary class label Y and denote with Yˆ the predicted probability for the positive label. The 
following procedure is routine in Machine Learning. First, split D and D˜j each into a training and 
test set. Second, fit a model separately on the training sets of the original and transformed data. 
Third, predict Yˆ on the test sets with  being the predictions for the original and  being the 
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predictions for the transformed data. We evaluate these predictions with the area under the 
receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC), which is a function of and Y . 
A transformation of D is a decision to add privacy, potentially at the cost of firm utility. 
Therefore, the transformation should minimize the regret of making this decision. Measuring 
firm utility as the performance in the corresponding classification task, regret R is defined as the 
difference in AUC obtained using the original and transformed data  
  . (5) 
Intuitively, it measures the loss in predictive performance by applying masking technique Tj. The 
optimal masking technique Tj∗ is then found via 
 
Since our masking mechanism is designed to maintain the predictive performance of the 
underlying classifier, we evaluate it more rigorously on a set of models; random forest, support 
vector machine as well as lasso, ridge and logistic regression (see following Section 4). 
4 COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS 
4.1 Empirical Setup 
In our empirical evaluation, we draw upon the task of churn prediction as this presents a 
common, yet challenging, undertaking in IS research. It is important for the firm to know which 
individuals will continue to purchase and who will churn. For the latter group, the firm may want 
to approach them proactively, e. g., by offering specific deals. Hence, the task of predicting churn 
is directly linked to a case where predictive utility can obtain substantial financial benefits, but 
where users might not want to reveal their true personal information. 
We specifically obtained a proprietary dataset as it better reflects the characteristics of data 
in real-world settings, such as a wide set of predictors and class imbalances. For that latter reason, 
we later draw upon the area under curve metric, as it is not sensitive to imbalances in the outcome 
variable. One might argue that the number and volume of purchases might present also very 
sensitive attributes. Therefore, we exclude these attributes from our masking algorithms. 
Table 1 lists the model variables from our dataset. For the purpose of our analysis, we treat age 
and gender as sensitive attributes. We observe that most individuals are male and in their forties 
to fifties. Some individuals apparently registered on the online platform but did not make any 
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purchase. The dataset is fairly imbalanced, as continuing use appears for less than a third of the 
customer base. 
The dataset is processed as follows. All variables with a skewed distribution are subject to a log-
transformation (e. g., number and volume of purchases). The dataset is further split into a training 
(n = 283, i. e., 71 %) and test set (n = 110, i. e., 21 %) at the turn of a year in order to rule out 
potential confounders from seasonal effects. 
Table 1: Model Variables. 
Predictor variables Outcome variable 
Sensitive variables Non-sensitive variables  
Age Number of purchases Binary label 
Gender Volume of purchases   …continuing use: 110 
 Days since last purchase   …churn: 273 
 Days since registration  
 Private/organizational customer  
4.2 Results 
The computational results for the regret are presented in Table 2. It reveals that our 
masking mechanism hardly affects predictive accuracy. Masking the sensitive attributes often 
even leads to a slight increase in the performance of the classification task (negative regret). In 
case of shuffling, the performance boost is even significant. Nevertheless, the average change is 
still below a percentage point with shuffling being the least regretful masking technique. This is 
particularly a promising result as shuffling is also the only method that does not alter marginal 
distributions and summary statistics about the sensitive attributes. 
Table 2: Prediction results under data masking. 
Classifier Shuffling Swapping Replacing 
 Mean (SD) CI Mean (SD) CI Mean (SD) CI 
Rf -1.95** (1.94) [-3.33; -0.56] -0.69 (1.46) [-0.35; 1.74] -1.22* (1.85) [-2.54; 0.11] 
SVM -0.39** (0.90) [-1.04; 0.26] -0.28 (1.07) [-1.05; 0.49] -0.09* (1.11) [-0.88; 0.71] 
Lasso -0.80** (0.97) [-1.49; -0.11] -0.67 (0.92) [-1.33; -0.04] -0.30* (0.84) [-0.93; 0.30] 
Ridge -0.70** (0.84) [-1.30; -0.11] -0.54 (0.82) [-1.12; 0.05] -0.31* (0.69) [-0.80; 0.19] 
Logit -0.91** (0.90) [-1.55; -0.27] -0.44 (0.69) [-0.93; 0.06] -0.37* (0.84) [-0.98; 0.23] 
Average -0.95*** (1.26) [-1.31; -0.59] -0.25 (1.10) [-0.56; 0.07] -0.46*** (1.17) [-0.79; -0.13] 
Notes: The table shows the mean regret for m=10 simulations with the standard deviation in brackets. A mean regret different from zero at 
the 10 %; 5 % and 1 % significance level is indicated by *; ** or *** respectively. The 95 % confidence interval assumes a t-distribution 
with ν =9 (model aggregate: ν =49) degrees of freedom. Regret is computed as the percentage point change in the area under the curve after 
masking sensitive data. In case of replacing, missing lower and upper bounds are respectively set to the minimum and maximum value of the 
corresponding attribute. Other parameters in subgrouping are left at their defaults. For the evaluation models, hyper-parameters are tuned 
using 10-fold repeated cross-validation. 
5 DISCUSSION 
5.1 Contributions to IS Research 
Extant research is dedicated to develop mechanisms and algorithms that transform personal 
data to achieve privacy for the individual (Aggarwal and Yu, 2008). There are two streams of 
literature that can be divided by the goal of anonymization (Agrawal and Aggarwal, 2001; 
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Garfinkel et al., 2007; Li and Sarkar, 2013; Yang et al., 2005) and confidentiality about sensitive 
attributes (Hann et al., 2007; Li and Sarkar, 2006; Muralidhar and Sarathy, 2006). However, few 
link privacy-preserving methods to predictive analytics, which is concerning given the empirical 
evidence that privacy can be extremely costly for data analytics (Brickell and Shmatikov, 2008). 
To the best of our knowledge, none of these works explicitly develops a custom predictive 
algorithm for information privacy. Prior privacy mechanisms for data masking aim at minimizing 
the changes to distributional properties of the data (Li and Sarkar, 2006; Muralidhar and Sarathy, 
2006). Predictions – if used at all – merely represents a form of evaluation but not the prime 
objective. From an algorithmic perspective, our masking mechanisms are designed to add 
perturbations where it is has little interferences with values that are decisive for forming 
predictions. Thus, our work addresses an imminent research gap in the area of privacy-preserving 
analytics as our proposed mechanism achieves high gains in information privacy, while 
simultaneously mitigating effects on the predictive utility. 
5.2 Limitations and Potential for Future Research 
Our masking mechanism yields no mathematical guarantees of how well the privacy of an 
individual is protected in the case of data breaches or other occasions where the data is shared. In 
fact, this objective is addressed in the context of differential privacy (Dwork, 2008; McSherry 
and Mironov, 2009), while our research acknowledges that firm-user interactions cannot work 
without user identification for legal and operational reasons. Instead, our mission is to limit the 
use of individual data with regard to certain attributes deemed as sensitive. 
5.3 Implications for Management and IS Practice 
Information privacy has considerable consequences for firms that want to benefit from the 
recent wave of predictive analytics (Chen et al., 2012). Prominent examples from our field 
include predictive analytics with the goal of targeted marketing, personalizing customer service 
offerings or predicting customer churn. Despite potential benefits, firms now face a dilemma 
where privacy-related features have become an integral element of online services, yet where 
potential improvements to information privacy remain untapped. For instance, bolstering 
information privacy could proof advertising to be more effective (Tucker, 2014) and positively 
influence customer purchase behavior (Tsai et al., 2011). 
Our empirical findings are encouraging for firms seeking to accommodate both data 
sparsity and predictive utility. In fact, our results demonstrate that both are not necessarily 
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mutually exclusive. Rather, firms can successfully obfuscate sensitive attributes by perturbing 
sensitive attributes without lowering the prediction performance of the corresponding task. This 
finding directly benefits managers that want to implement similar approaches in order for 
individuals to benefit from a reduced disclosure of sensitive attributes. 
The findings become especially relevant as “freemium” remains a dominant business 
model in online settings. Even though individuals have been found to be willing to pay for 
increased information privacy Hann et al. (2007), the majority rather prefer to save money when 
being confronted with the trade-off between sharing personal information and receiving a lower 
price (Beresford et al., 2012). Our work especially pertains to firms operating in such settings, as 
it might be feasible to increase information privacy with marginal downsides for data-driven 
decision-making. 
In our work, we deliberately introduce the trade-off between privacy-sensitive attributes and 
predictive utility as a managerial decision problem. This allows firms to vary the extent of 
perturbation or shuffling depending on the underlying prediction task and the desired loss in 
prediction accuracy. Hence, firms can choose to maximize masking in order to attract privacy-
sensitive individuals. Alternatively, they can prefer to bolster firm utility by luring individuals 
with personalized product and services. By incorporating our proposed regret metric into 
managerial decision-making, it is further possible for firms to quantify the effects of stronger data 
masking. This is important because it is difficult for firms to offer individuals more privacy when 
they can hardly estimate the value of utilizing less personal information. As a consequence, we 
suggest that firms should base their decision about the appropriate privacy mechanism on the 
regret of the respective data transformation. 
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